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The Danish Ombudsman - Citizens, Parliament and EU   
 
 
Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the European Group of Public Administration, 
Permanent Study Group X (Law and Public Administration), Wednesday 2 September 2009.  
 
 
By Michael Gøtze, School of Law, University of Copenhagen  
 
 
 
 
1. Two Research Themes  
 
When ombudsmen institutions investigate and assess whether public authorities comply with 
principles of good administration, the institutions do not act isolated from their 
administrative, legal and political context. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental characteristics 
of ombudsman institutions that they interact and must interact with other agents in order to 
make a difference. With a view to this, the first part of this paper focuses on the interaction 
between the ombudsman and the parliament. The perspective is mainly empirical and the 
article emphasizes that parliamentary support is crucial to the impact of ombudsman. 
Generally, there is often a fragmentary focus on this topic and the complexity of the topic. 
Nonetheless, in the mind of the citizen the pivotal question as to ombudsman control is 
whether his/her complaint translates into action. On this backdrop, the paper seeks to clarify 
the role of the ombudsman as an intermediary between citizen and parliament.  
 
In addition I wish in this paper to focus on the contribution by ombudsmen institutions to the 
development and enforcement of European Union Law. Formally, there is no doubt that 
European Law such as regulations, directives and ECJ practice is part of national law. 
According to the principles of supremacy and direct effect there is a – at least at the 
theoretical level - presumption that European Law forms part of the legal assessments of 
national ombudsmen. However there is limited comparative and comprehensive exploration 
of the usage by national ombudsman institution of European Law principles.  
 
The primary object of the my analysis is the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman – one of the 
oldest ombudsman institutions in the world and a well-established ombudsman institution 
within its national context – but the study can hopefully be of general interest to the 
understanding of ombudsmen. There are no administrative courts in Denmark. This is no 
doubt one of the basic reasons why the Danish ombudsman enjoys a very strong position in 
Danish law. The well-developed range of parliamentary actions is another reason to the 
strength of the Danish ombudsman. It goes without saying that parliamentary backing and 
assistance can be political as well as legislative. As a result of the overall parliamentary - and 
state perspective - my analysis does not focus in detail on ombudsman review of local 
authorities even though this theme is interesting in itself. As to supervision of state 
administration, however, my conclusion is that parliamentary actions are effective and that 
legislative actions play a minor role as an outcome of ombudsman cases in Denmark.  
 
As the contributions of the ombudsman to the enforcement and development of European 
Union Law within the national context, this is an important research topic. It is still in the 
making, however, In a Danish context, the absence of exploration and discussion of this 
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aspect of ombudsman control is increasingly surprising due to the fact that the Denmark has 
been a member of the European Community since 1973 and that the ombudsman was 
established in 955. This paper offers preliminary considerations on ombudsman and EU-law.   
 
 
2.  Scandinavian Ombudsman Models 
 
Today, all Scandinavian countries have ombudsmen institution according to constitutional 
provisions. Although there are similarities between the Scandinavian ombudsmen, the role of 
the ombudsman in the national context varies. The Swedish ombudsman is the oldest in the 
world dating back to 1809. The general framework is that the holder of the office is 
appointed by the legislator. He is independent of both executive and judiciary and is 
empowered to inquire into administrative and executive acts. His normative function is to 
safeguard the interests of citizens by ensuring administration according to law, discovering 
instances of maladministration and eliminating defects in administration. Subsequent 
ombudsman institutions were created in Finland in 1920, in Denmark in 1955 and in Norway 
in 1962.1 In all countries the ombudsman has little formal power towards public authorities 
other than the rights to investigate, inspect and to demand adequate information. 
Compensating for the lack of binding and formal powers, the interaction between the 
ombudsman and the national Parliament has proved a dynamic tool in Denmark in the 
transformation of ombudsman opinions into action and compliance.  
 
In practice, the interaction and interdependence is highly complex, however. Generally, the 
complexity is reflected in the pluralities of roles of the Parliament. At least three basic roles 
can be identified. Firstly, the Parliament appoints the ombudsman, secondly, the Parliament 
supports the appointed ombudsman in a number of ways in his supervision of the executive 
and thirdly, the Parliament is itself – as far as the Ministers of Government acting as 
administrative heads of the executive are concerned - subject to the scrutiny of the 
ombudsman. The second role is elaborated in the following. With a view to this it is not 
surprising that the ombudsman model can hardly be described in the terms of a traditional 
doctrine of separation of powers.  Although the ombudsman institution has its basis in the 
Parliament, the institution acts in practice in a mix of crossing roads between the Parliament, 
the complainants, the public administration, the courts of law and the media. 
 
Prosecutor or Quasi-Administrative Court 
Scandinavian ombudsmen can be divided into two models: the disciplinary authority model 
(Swedish-Finnish model) the quasi administrative court model (Danish-Norwegian model).  
 
A characteristic of the former is the power of the ombudsman to act as a prosecutor and to 
bring criminal charges or disciplinary procedures against individual public officials for 
malfeasance or other irregularities. The focus of the disciplinary ombudsman is the correct 
behaviour of the public employees, not the decisions of public authorities. In practice, the 
Swedish and Finnish ombudsmen have an inclination to expressing criticism or putting 
forward recommendation and not exercising their criminal law and disciplinary powers. Even 
though the prosecuting powers rest as means of enforcement, the knowledge of their 
existence – as a sword of Damocles - among public officials no doubt enhance compliance.  
 
                                                 
1
 General information on a number of Scandinavian ombudsmen is available on the following addresses: 
Sweden: www.jo.se (Justitieombudsmannen), Finland: www.ombudsman.fi (Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies), 
Denmark: www.ombudsmanden (Folketingets Ombudsmand) and Norway:  www.sivilombudsmannen.no 
(Stortingets sivilombudsman). 
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As to areas of normative focus, the modern Finnish ombudsman has a statutory duty to take 
an interest in human rights and fundamental rights. This is a result of a constitutional 
elaboration in 1995 of the fundamental rights provisions. The intention is to bring these 
rights closer to the level of practical application and to enhance their influence on daily 
administration in Finland. In other words, the development of (the visibility) of human rights 
is part of the ombudsman’s statutory responsibilities. As opposed to the defined role of the 
Finnish Ombudsman, the Danish Ombudsman formally enjoys a much more autonomous role 
in supervising the executive and in developing legal principles of good administration.  
 
Characteristic of both Sweden and Finland is, moreover, that they have established a number 
of specialised ombudsmen institutions with specific legal competences e.g. the Data 
Protection Ombudsman, the Equality Ombudsman, the Ombudsman for Minorities and the 
Children’s Ombudsman. Their powers also apply to the private sector.  
 
The Danish-Norwegian ombudsman model functions to a wide extent as an administrative 
quasi-court reviewing public authorities as such and assessing general administrative law 
principles. The ombudsman is primarily concerned with the rule of law. At the outset, the 
Danish ombudsman was designed an equivalent to the Swedish Ombudsman but the Danish 
institution has evolved independently. The Danish ombudsman has never exercised his 
original possibilities of initiating criminal or disciplinary proceedings and the general focus 
of both the Danish and Norwegian ombudsmen has been administrative decisions and 
activities of public institutions rather than the behaviour of individual civil servants. The 
perspective has been institutional, not personal.  At the revision of the Danish Ombudsman 
Act in the 1990s the disciplinary powers of the Ombudsman were completely omitted due to 
this long-standing practice. One of the motivations of the Danish ombudsman to subscribe to 
the institutional perspective is the endeavour to avoid the level of conflict that a personal 
investigation and criticism by the ombudsman might envoke. Not surprisingly, the Danish 
ombudsman has strived for a climate of negotiation and dialogue with public authorities in 
order to improve the chances of convincing them of the justification of his opinions and 
recommendations. In all Scandinavian ombudsman models, however, there has likewise been 
a development towards minimizing the confrontational and disciplinary role.  
 
Profile of the Danish Ombudsman - the Rule of Law 
The ombudsman institution was established as part of the (amended) Danish Constitution of 
1953 reflecting a need for improved protection of the individual citizen against public 
authorities.2 The ordinary courts did not suffice as a control mechanisms in this respect. The 
economic reconstruction of Danish society after World War II had necessitated a powerful 
state and administrative apparatus with extensive powers. The public administration grew 
immensely in size and the Parliament enacted an increasingly number of regulations 
providing administrative agencies with both numerous and discretionary open-ended powers. 
As a counter-measure to the growing interference by the executive into the spheres of 
individual citizens, the ombudsman institution was established in 1955.  
 
As to areas of normative focus, the anticipation in the beginning was that the ombudsman 
should review especially the compliance with substantive principles of law, such as legality, 
equality, proportionality and the rule of law. To some degree, the Danish ombudsman has 
                                                 
2
 Basic material in English on the Danish Ombudsman can be found in The Danish Ombudsman, 1995, and the 
subsequent publication, The Danish Ombudsman, 2005, I-III, all produced by the Danish Ombudsman. An 
introduction can also be found in Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jon Andersen, The Ombudsman’s Role from a 
Nordic Perspective, 1996 The European Yearbook of Comparative Government and Public Administration 3, 
pp. 309-319.  Most material in English – and Danish – on the ombudsman is produced by the ombudsman..  
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realised this intention and has additionally in some cases expanded his review of legality etc. 
towards appraising also the appropriateness of administrative decisions. Over the years, 
however, the most distinct feature of the focus of the Danish ombudsman has been his 
development of procedural requirements relating to the processing of an administrative case 
such as the obligations to make a hearing and to give reasons. It is a recurrent part of the 
ombudsman’s investigation and assessment to check procedural errors. The preference of 
procedure over substance is partly due to the fact that the Danish Public Administration Act 
only deals with procedural matters.3 At a practical level, moreover, the non-compliance by 
the executive of procedural requirements can be relatively easily scrutinized by the 
ombudsman on the basis of the documents of the case. Unlike the courts, the ombudsman 
does not have the powers to hear witnesses and his review is based on written material.  
 
In principle, the Danish ombudsman’s supervision of public agencies comprises a broader 
spectrum of legal sources than national legislation such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights and EU-regulations. The Convention was formally incorporated into Danish 
law in 1991 and the ombudsman institution has in a number of cases - especially regarding 
freedom of speech - made reference to the Convention (article 10).4 Generally, the 
ombudsman prefers to apply the provisions on human rights in the Danish Constitution or to 
fall back on the Danish Public Administration Act. As to EU-law the ombudsman has 
generally exercised a cautious review. Currently, there is a debate in Danish law as to the 
ombudsman’s contribution to the European challenge that I will get back to later on in this 
paper.5 The Danish ombudsman is part of the co-operation between the European 
Ombudsmen and national ombudsmen (European Network of Ombudsmen - ENO)6 and this 
may in the long run give impetus to the enforcement of EU-law in a Danish context.   
 
 
3. The Impact of the Ombudsman 
 
As to question of impact and influence, it is by definition difficult to measure and compare 
different ombudsman institutions. The nature of impact and influence is not subject to simple 
quantification and, in any case, there is a plurality of determining factors.  
 
• No administrative courts  
Basically, the Danish ombudsman institution enjoys a fundamentally strong position due to 
the fact that there are no administrative courts in Denmark as opposed to Sweden and 
Finland. Denmark has a system of ordinary courts of law that review all kind of cases in 
private law, public law and criminal law. Thus, the overall structure of the Danish control 
system provides the ombudsman with a central position. Moreover, the ordinary Danish 
courts until recently mostly reviewed private law cases and conversely only few public law 
cases leaving normative space to the Danish ombudsman institution and its development of 
general legal principles. For the time being, however, this relationship between courts and 
                                                 
3
 Act No 571 of 19 June 1995 with subsequent amendments (Forvaltningsloven). 
4
 So far, neither complainants nor the Danish ombudsman have made reference to Article 41 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, Chapter V, stating that every citizen has a fundamental right to good administration.   
5
 Michael Gøtze, The Enforcement of European Union Law by the Ombudsman, “Juristen” (a Danish Law 
Review – not yet translated into English), 2009, p. 91-102.  
6
 See on the network e.g. Alexandros Tsadiras, “Rules of institutional “flat-sharing” – the European ombudsman 
and his national peers”, 2008 European Law Review 33 (1), pp. 101-115.      
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ombudsman is in a period of transition due to the fact that the courts receive a rapidly 
growing amount of administrative cases.7    
 
• Broad Ombudsman Competence 
A supplementary basic reason is that the Danish ombudsman is normatively omnipotent 
within the public law field in the sense that the institution can deal with almost all aspects of 
administrative law. The legal framework of the ombudsman in the Danish Ombudsman Act 
is mostly open-ended and programmatic containing only few limitations of the ombudsman’s 
normative review of public authorities.8   
 
• Compliance by public authorities  
If construed as the specific adherence by public authorities with ombudsman opinions and 
recommendations, the influence of the current Danish ombudsman is probably considerable, 
at least as far as state and government authorities are concerned. Basically, the Danish 
ombudsman opinions are in most cases likely to be accepted due to the mere facts that 
Danish public administration operates in a small society and that the Danish public officials 
are well-educated and have high moral standards. No empirical and official figure of actual 
compliance exists, however, and the question as to the precise compliance by state and local 
authorities remains somewhat open. As opposed to this, it can be noted that the European 
Ombudsman explicitly reports the follow-up actions by EU-institutions.9 
 
• Ombudsman and Media - brothers in arms 
A supplementary impact factor is no doubt the support of the ombudsman by national media. 
In this respect it has been an immense advantage to the Danish ombudsman that there is only 
one ombudsman and that the reference in the press to the ombudsman as an institution is thus 
unambiguous.10 The Swedish model is different in this respect due to the existence of special 
ombudsman and due to the fact that the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman itself is not one 
person, but four persons with specific supervisory areas. As a result of the recurrent focus of 
the Danish media on cases between citizens and public authorities, the Danish ombudsman is 
also a recurrent agent on the media stage. Frequently, the sympathy of the media lies with the 
citizen who is allegedly wronged by public administration and this phenomenon in itself 
nourishes and confirms the perception of the ombudsman as a protector of the individual.  
 
The power of the joint forces of the Danish ombudsman and the press can be illustrated by a 
highly political ombudsman case from 2007 in which the Danish ombudsman confronted the 
Danish Prime Minister in an extraordinary way.11 The ombudsman put forward harsh 
criticism of the Prime Minister for refusing to give an interview to a journalist from a tabloid 
newspaper. The intended topic of the interview was the Danish Government’s decision to 
participate in the Iraq war in 2003. Initially, the Prime Minister completely ignored the 
recommendation of the ombudsman. After having written an open letter to the Prime 
                                                 
7
 According to statistical information from the Danish courts, the present amount of administrative law cases 
within the court system is 70 % of the total amount of civil law cases.   
8
 Act No 473 of 12 June 1996 (Ombudsmandsloven).  
9
 See e.g. “Study of follow-up given by institutions to critical remarks and further remarks made by the 
ombudsman in 2006”, published 22 May 2008 by the European Ombudsman.   
10
 The term “ombudsman” is legally protected by the Danish Ombudsman Act in order to avoid a watering 
down. In recent year, the introduction of local control bodies within certain Danish municipalities has give rise 
to discussions of the usage of the term. In spite of their ombudsman-like functions these local control bodies are 
not allowed to do make use of the term “ombudsman”. The only other ombudsman in Denmark - apart from the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman - is the Consumer Ombudsman Office who has explicit legal basis for its name.   
11
 The case is found in the Annual Report 2007 of the Danish Ombudsman p. 347 et seq. 
 6 
Minister, published in the Danish press, the ombudsman persuaded the Prime Minister to 
comply with the ombudsman’s recommendation and to give the controversial interview.     
 
• Compliance by Courts  
The question of the courts’ compliance with ombudsman opinions is also highly relevant to a 
qualitative analysis of the impact of ombudsman institutions. The courts can review the same 
case as the ombudsman if a citizen or an authority brings the case before the courts. 
Typically, however, the overlap consists in a situation where the courts review the same legal 
principle or legal problem e.g. the right to a hearing that has been dealt with by the 
ombudsman in another case. There is no tracking in Danish law of the coherence between the 
courts’ and the ombudsman’s application of law. According to the Danish ombudsman, the 
courts in most cases confirm the positions of the ombudsman whereas other studies show that 
there are a number of normative differences between Danish courts and the ombudsman.   
 
• Conceptual impact on legal thinking   
As to conceptual and intellectual impact, the Danish ombudsman is arguably the most 
influential ombudsman institution in Scandinavia. This is inter alia reflected by the facts that 
ombudsman’s practice is massively quoted in Danish legal literature - as a source of law - 
and that the ombudsman is generally perceived by politicians, citizens and the press as a 
guardian of good administration. An important explanation for this stronghold of the Danish 
ombudsman is multilevel parliamentary support as we will discuss in detail later.  
 
In this respect, an interesting characteristic of the Danish Ombudsman is his ties to academia. 
This is primarily reflected in the recruitment of ombudsmen. Among the four Danish 
ombudsmen so far, three candidates have had academic career profiles as professors or 
doctors of law in criminal law, administrative law or criminal procedure law. The current 
Danish ombudsman – appointed in 1987 - is no exception. The distinct academic profile of 
the institution is further enhanced by the multilevel academic activities of the ombudsman 
institution as a whole. The ombudsman himself and his executive staff produce extensive 
legal writings within the field of public law especially administrative law – e.g. textbooks, 
articles, annotation of legislation - and are involved in teaching in numerous contexts. It is 
difficult to overestimate the importance of the academic and educational activities of the 
Danish ombudsman as to ensuring and consolidating the authority of the institution.   
 
 
4. Citizen Complaints as a Source of Ombudsman Action 
 
The most fundamental access of citizens to the Parliament is of course the right to vote at 
general elections and thus influence the decisions and actions of the elected Parliament. As a 
specific channel into the Danish parliamentary sphere during the election term, both 
organisations and citizens have a right of obtaining an interview with the standing 
parliamentary committees and citizens can within this framework present problems and 
opinions to the relevant politicians on the committee. The members of the committee can ask 
questions to the citizens but do not embark on discussions. Another means of obtaining 
contact with the Danish Parliament is the right to lodge complaints with the ombudsman. The 
establishment of the ombudsman relieves the Parliament of the task of relating to individual 
queries from citizens concerning administrative authorities and the intermediary role of the 
ombudsman is - in abstract terms - to qualify the citizen’s complaints. 
  
Inherent in the Danish ombudsman model is the existence of only a minimum of legal 
barriers to access to the ombudsman as an intermediary. According to the actio popularis 
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principle anybody may lodge a complaint with the ombudsman and there is no requirement 
of material interest in the case.12 There are only few formal requirements that must be met, 
such as a requirement that attempts should have been made to resolve conflicts within the 
system of administrative recourse before the ombudsman is involved in the case. However, 
the open access does not mean that all complaints are handled. In practice, the Danish 
ombudsman enjoys a large measure of independence in selecting complaints and it left to his 
discretion whether a complaint affords adequate grounds for investigation. Generally, the 
ombudsman’s policy of selection is to admit complaints that deal with general principles in 
administrative law and with issues of general interest.   
 
Currently, the majority of Danish ombudsman cases are complaint cases. Some 3700 of an 
annual total of 4000 cases are complaints from citizens. Citizens see the ombudsman as an 
easily and freely accessible court of appeal against administrative decisions in particular in 
relation to areas where the inequality between the administration and those concerned by its 
decisions is greatest such as the areas of e.g. social benefits, immigration, taxation and 
employment matters. The citizens that lodge complaints are private individuals and it is not 
customary that enterprises and businesses turn to the ombudsman for assistance with 
conflicts with public authorities. Generally, this is no doubt that the ombudsman is perceived 
as a watchdog institution that serves individual persons rather than companies. So far, 
however, there has been no scrutiny in Danish law as to what types of people who complain 
to the ombudsman. The majority of complaints deal with decisions – l’actes administrative. 
Some 70 % of the complaints pertain to administrative decisions whereas the residual 
complaints deal with e.g. lengthy processing time of the administration. As to the substantive 
areas of public authorities the complaints fall within criminal matters, social law, 
immigration law, environmental law, taxation law, local government law and employment 
law. About 75 % of the total number of complaints is immediately rejected by the 
ombudsman primarily due to the fact that the citizens have not exhausted administrative 
redress. With this reduction, this annual input from citizens is less than a 1000 cases. The 
percentage of cases that ends up with a critical opinion from the ombudsman is generally 20 
%. In addition, the Danish ombudsman institution gives informal advice to citizens. 
 
The Danish ombudsman epitomizes the idea of ombudsman to Danes and the international 
ombudsman perspective has a peripheral status in Danish law. The right of Danish citizens to 
lodge complaints with the European Ombudsman is rarely exercised.  According to the 
European Ombudsman office, a total of only 95 Danish complaints have lodged complaints 
with the European Ombudsman from April 2003 until 2007 representing a considerably 
lower percentage of complaints than the one would expect taking the relative size of the 
Danish population of the EU population into consideration.13      
 
  
5. Ombudsman Actions per se    
 
From a formal point of view, the ombudsman has very limited powers. The opinions and 
recommendations per se of the ombudsman are soft law in the sense that the public 
authorities are not legally obliged to comply with them. This is a well-known basic feature.  
                                                 
12
 During the revision of the Danish Ombudsman Act in the 1990s it was discussed whether the “actio 
popularis” should be narrowed. The proposal was not adopted. See Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Ombudsman 
as a non-traditional tool for citizen participation, 1998, The International Ombudsman Yearbook, p. 189 et seq. 
13
 See general statistics concerning the work of the European Ombudsman in e.g. the publication “What can the 
European Ombudsman do for you”, 2008. The European Ombudsman is described comprehensively in e.g. 
Katja Heede, European Ombudsman, redress and control at Union level, 2000.  
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As to the current catalogue of ombudsman actions as such, the Danish Ombudsman Act 
states that the ombudsman “may express criticism, make recommendations and otherwise 
state his view of a case”. The ombudsman has a wide choice of wording when stating his 
opinion of a case. If he states that the authority’s decision cannot give him cause for 
comment or ground for criticism, this may imply actual agreement with the authority but it 
may also reflect the fact that the ombudsman has limited his examination of the case. The 
opinion of the ombudsman is phrased in the first person singular underlying the fact that the 
opinion is given by the ombudsman personally. The ombudsman expresses his opinion on 
behalf of the Parliament and this has eo ipso an impact in most cases. A recommendation is 
put forward if the ombudsman considers that an administrative decision should be rescinded 
or changed. The written recommendation of the ombudsman is attached with thorough 
summaries of the facts of the case and with thorough arguments in order to convince the 
recipient authority of the justification of his opinion. If an authority refuses to comply with a 
recommendation by the ombudsman, the ombudsman may recommend that the complainant 
be granted free legal as to bringing the case before the court. Such recommendations by the 
ombudsman are invariably complied with the directorate dealing with free aid legal matters.  
 
Although the impact of ombudsman sanctions and actions per se is limited, it must not be 
forgotten that the ombudsman has a number of investigate powers. Firstly, the ombudsman 
can launch an investigation on his own initiative. To most public authorities even the 
prospect of being involved in an ombudsman investigation means a loss of prestige. In 
conjunction with the negative press coverage that an investigation on a controversial issue 
typically arises,  an ombudsman investigation own his own initiative often lead to 
improvements by the public authority even if the ombudsman has not made any conclusions. 
Secondly, the ombudsman can perform extensive inquisitorial activities during an 
investigation and Danish authorities are obliged to furnish the ombudsman with information 
and document if the information and documents must be assumed to of importance to the 
ombudsman’s investigation. Also this obligation to contribute to an ongoing investigation 
can in itself produce changes and remedies within the administrative authorities at a 
preliminary stage. Finally, it is common ground among public authorities that the percentage 
of criticism in investigation cases that are initiated ex officio by the ombudsman is 
considerably higher than in investigation cases that are products of complaint from citizens. 
About 40 % of the ombudsman’s own initiative investigations conclude in legal terms that 
there is something rotten in the state of Denmark. Thus, an investigation is perceived by the 
public administration as if not anticipated criticism then at least a bad omen. Even in some 
complaints cases, the ombudsman may simply inform the public authority about the 
compliant in order to make the authority resolve the problem. 
 
 
6. Support by the Parliament   
 
I now turn to the interplay between the ombudsman and Parliament in more specific terms. 
The Ombudsman Act and, in particular, the practices of the ombudsman and the Folketing set 
the stage for the interaction between the ombudsman and the Parliament. Not only the 
general support by the Folketing but also political and legislative actions have been of 
importance to the carrying out of Danish ombudsman control of state administration.  
 
• Symbolic Support 
The Danish Ombudsman Act contains provisions on the election and dismissal of the 
ombudsman. The Danish Parliament acts an employer vis-à-vis the ombudsman personally as 
 9 
to the initial and the final stages in the ombudsman’s term of service. Thus, the ombudsman 
is elected by the Folketing after each general election in a majority vote and can be dismissed 
by the Parliament if the ombudsman ceases to the confidence of Parliament. The election of 
the ombudsman is made on the recommendation of the Legal Affairs Committee of the 
Folketing. There are only few written requirements as to the qualifications of the ombudsman 
but in practice it is considered of particular importance that the candidate can be regarded as 
party political neutral and that the election is likely to have the support of all or a  broad 
majority of the political parties. There is no fixed ombudsman term in Danish law as opposed 
to e.g. Swedish and Finnish law. At the outset, the ombudsman is highly dependant on the 
Parliament. As to the dismissal procedure, there are no specific grounds of dismissal in the 
Ombudsman Act and it is left to Parliament to define the concept of lack of confidence. So 
far the dismissal procedure has never been put into play and the vast majority of the political 
parties in the Folketing have consistently supported the ombudsman.14 
 
The fact that the ombudsman acts on a political and parliamentary mandate is a significant 
and fundamental feature of the ombudsman model. The ombudsman works in collaboration 
with the Folketing and performs his task of overseeing public administration as the official 
and trusted representative of the Parliament. It is very important that the ombudsman receives 
the backing of the Parliament and a corresponding backing by public opinion – above all the 
backing of the press. The backing of the Folketing manifest itself not only in the formal 
election of the ombudsman but also in the fact that the Parliament presumptively supports 
and shares the general legal values of the ombudsman such as legality, the rule of law and 
good administration. However elusive the presumptive and symbolical support by the 
Folketing might be, it no doubt contributes to the strength of the ombudsman.  
 
• Political actions by the Parliament 
The most important and effective political actions in the wake of an ombudsman 
investigation or a final ombudsman opinion revolve around the system of standing 
committees in the Folketing. When the ombudsman deals with state authorities, he deals 
ultimately with a Minister of Government acting as head of the administrative authority. A 
well-established practice in Denmark is parliamentary intervention towards the responsible 
Minister by means of a consultation in the relevant parliamentary committee. The 
committees are the workshops of the Folketing and all major decisions are prepared in the 
relevant committees. The Folketing has 25 standing committees and the working sphere of a 
committee roughly corresponds to that of a ministry. The Ministry of Social Affairs for 
instance corresponds to a Social Affairs Committee, the Ministry of Taxation to a Fiscal 
Affairs Committee and so on.15 At the opening of each parliamentary year and after general 
elections, the Folketing appoints members from the Folketing to sit on the committees. The 
individual political parties are represented according to the number of seats which the parties 
have obtained in the Folketing. Thus, the committees politically reflect the Chamber.  
 
The task of the committees is primarily linked to the reading of Bills. In addition, the 
committees follow the general development within their spheres of competence and this is 
where the political support to the ombudsman comes into play. The members of the 
committee may ask a Minister to appear in the committee in order to answer questions 
                                                 
14
 The present Danish ombudsman was re-elected in 1987, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2007. He 
has held the ombudsman office both under mainly Conservative-Liberal led and Social Democrat governments.   
15
 Other important standing committees are: the Labour Market Committee, the Trade and Industry committee, 
the European Affairs Committee, the Defence Committee, the Municipal Affairs Committee, the Cultural 
Affairs Committee, the Economic and Political Affairs Committee, the Social Services Committee, the 
Educations Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Immigration and Integration Affairs Committee.   
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according to the consultation procedure. Such consultation frequently takes place in an open 
meeting. A releasing factor of a consultation with a Minster is the ombudsman’s 
investigations. If the ombudsman has expressed criticism as a response to a citizen’s 
compliant, the committee subsequently asks questions as to the remedies and proposed 
actions of the Minister acting as head of the executive. The result of the consultation is 
almost invariably that the Minster decides to adhere with the ombudsman in order to avoid 
additional political pressure. The tendency to appeasement is enhanced if there is press 
coverage of the case. Functioning as a sword of Damocles, the mere prospect of a 
consultation procedure is sometimes in itself a sufficient means of ensuring compliance by 
the Minister with ombudsman cases. Generally, there is an increasing usage of the 
consultation procedure and the annual amount of questions asked is some 700. There is no 
comprehensive tracking of the amount of questions that is initiated by the ombudsman but it 
is a significant part.      
 
At the time being, as a result of a pending and highly controversial ombudsman case 
concerning the right to family reunification under EU-law on the free movement of persons 
and on union citizenship, the Danish Integration Authorities have already made substantial 
alterations to Danish guidelines on the scope of the right of the individual to family 
reunification. The current Danish Minister of Integration has been consulted by the Legal 
Affairs Committee with a view to the ongoing ombudsman investigation and the minister has 
decided to change administrative practices beforehand.16  
 
As to the contact between the committees and the ombudsman about pending and concluded 
ombudsman cases, it was formerly the practice of the Legal Affairs Committee to review 
cases passed to them by the ombudsman and to distribute them to the relevant committee. 
The relevant committee would then ask the Minister in charge to comment of the 
ombudsman’s assessment and any criticism expressed. The Minister’s comments were 
returned to the ombudsman through the Legal Affairs Committee. This procedure was 
abandoned in the late 1990s in favour of a quicker and more direct contact between the 
committee and the ombudsman and the interaction may also take place on an informal basis.  
 
• Legislative actions by the Parliament  
The Danish Parliament only rarely acts on a general legislative level as a result of 
ombudsman complaints. The law-making process is a time consuming process and it is not 
perceived as the most effective response to an acute problem involving a citizen and a public 
authority. At a specific level, however, Folketing quite frequently decides to pass legislation 
that extends financial subsidies and grants to the public authority that has been the object of 
an ombudsman investigation or assessment. With the financial intervention by the Folketing, 
a critical opinion by the ombudsman turns into a positive change for the responsible authority 
in the shape of extended resources providing the authority with better possibilities of 
adhering to the guidelines of the ombudsman. No matter how ominous an ombudsman 
investigation might be perceived by an authority at a first glance, the ombudsman activity – 
especially his inspections of prisons and mental hospitals – has often drawn the attention of 
the Folketing to the problems of the authorities. A parliamentary metamorphosis sets in and 
the final outcome of the ombudsman’s case is to the benefit of the public authority.   
                                                 
16
 The investigation by the ombudsman is a result of inter alia the judgement of 25 July 2008 of the European 
Court in Case C-127/08, Metock, and of European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Members States. The Danish Ombudsman investigates whether the responsible Danish public 
authorites have given proper advice to citizens as to their rights under the European regulations or whether the 
Danish authorities have only taken the - restrictive - current Danish immigration legislation into consideration.    
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• General legislative actions – Public Administration Act  
As to general legislative actions, the enactment of the Danish Public Administration Act in 
the 1980s is the primary contribution of the Folketing within the field of administrative law. 
The Act was developed and enacted following the early ombudsman practice pertaining to 
the procedural requirement of administrative law and, for the most part, the Act simply 
codifies general legal principles that were already in effect as unwritten rules. The Act 
focuses on the administrative procedures and formalities that must be adhered to by public 
authorities when handling cases. The Danish Administration Act is not particularly elaborate 
but lays down only the basic rules such as the duty of public authorities to assist citizens, the 
right of citizens with a material interest in the case to access to documents, the right of the 
citizen to be heard prior to decisions, the duties of public authorities to give reasons and to 
inform the citizens of the possibilities of administrative recourse. Thus, the scope of the Act 
is much narrower than e.g. the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour of the 
European Ombudsman.17 
 
The Danish Public Administration Act of 1985 is still the basic formal framework of Danish 
administrative procedural law. However, due to the fact that the Act is a minimum protection 
act and that the ombudsman has taken a dynamic and activistic approach to the interpretation 
of its concrete provisions, the scope of the Act has developed considerably. In a number of 
aspects, the ombudsman has widened the scope of the Act and the Parliament has not 
opposed this extensive widening of the Act. The Folketing has left the original text of the  
Act from the 1980’s more of less untouched and has in practice delegated important parts of 
its normative powers within the administrative law areas to the Parliamentary ombudsman. 
Today, the Danish Public Administration Act can only be applied and interpreted in close 
combination with relevant case-law from the Danish ombudsman.  
 
The normative activism of the ombudsman has not been unchallenged, however. In particular 
in the field of employment law, the ombudsman’s approach has given rise to debate. In a 
number of cases, the ombudsman has put forward a dynamic interpretation of the Danish 
Public Administration Act preventing the usage of agreements on resignation between public 
employers and employees on resignation. According to the ombudsman, such bilateral 
agreements cannot be made and the employer must comply with the administrative law 
requirements of for instance the right to a prior hearing. The interpretation of the ombudsman 
implies a more rigid labour market in the public sector than in the private sector which is 
contrary to a number of general labour market regulations. With a view to this, the Danish 
Supreme Court in 2004 explicitly overruled the ombudsman in a couple of distinct 
judgements and allowed e.g. agreements on resignation within the public sector. 
Subsequently, the Danish ombudsman has himself suggested that the Parliament might take 
legislative actions in order to clarify the matter. This still remains to be done. 18  
 
 
7. Enforcement of EU-law: Ombudsman Contributions 
 
From an abstract point of view the ombudsman institution is well suited for enforcing and 
developing citizen rights on the basis of European Union Law. The legal focus of 
                                                 
17
 The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour was approved in September by the 2001 by the 
Euroepan Parliament. See www.ombudsman.europa.eu  
18
 See Decision of 16 November 2004 of the Danish Supreme Court, reported in Danish Law Law Journal (UfR) 
2005 p. 616 et seq.  
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ombudsman scrutiny and assessment in complaint cases is existing legislation. This is 
explicitly stipulated in the Danish Ombudsman Act: “The ombudsman shall asses whether 
any authorities or persons falling within his jurisdiction act in contravention of existing 
legislation or other commit errors or derelictions in the discharge of their function”. There is 
no doubt that EU-law is part of existing legislation in Denmark. As the quantitative 
importance of written secondary EU-law, e.g. regulation and directives, in Danish law it has 
been estimated by the Danish Justice Department that approx. 20 percent of the acts and bill 
that are enacted in Parliament are based on European sources of law.  
 
• Ombudsman as a flexible control mechanism  
Typically, ombudsman institution disposes of a number of instruments that can enhance the 
enforcement of European Union Law if this is the priority of the institution. The right to 
select cases among the bulk of complaints lodged with the ombudsman – and conversely to 
reject cases with no general legal interest – provides the ombudsman with an important 
autonomy in his case-handling. He can thus regulate the case-flow in general and the 
character of cases and legal problems in particular. In addition, the right to initiate case ex 
officio is a ombudsman possibility which has no equivalent in the Danish court system. By 
initiating cases on EU-law, this ombudsman can no doubt contribute to the development of 
this part of existing law. As to the Danish ombudsman in this respect, it can be noted that the 
institution has so far initiated very few cases with a European profile. So far the predominant 
legal theme in such pro-active investigations is national administrative law.  
 
• Active ombudsman assistance in compliant cases  
Even in complaint cases, the ombudsman enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy in so far 
as the ombudsman can revise and expand the complaint themes of the citizens – for instance 
as far as relevant EU-regulation is concerned – if the ombudsman sees a need for such 
assistance to the citizen. As oppose to this, a court is to a large degree prevented from 
intervening in the claims that the parties put forward vis-à-vis the court. In addition, the 
ombudsman is responsible for the scrutiny of the facts of the case as well as the legal 
qualification of the legal problems at hand. As to the Danish context, the number of 
complaint cases involving EU-law is very limited and the ombudsman seems to be quite 
cautious in exercising his possibilities of assisting the citizen with a view to EU-law.  
 
• Open ombudsman reasoning  
As a final point, the explicit and lengthy reasoning by the ombudsman in opinions can be 
seen as an argumentative stronghold as far as the development of European law principles is 
concerned. The fact that the ombudsman does not hand down a decision dealing only with 
the case at hand but also has the possibility of taking a more general approach to the legal 
problem that the case involves is not without relevance. If the citizen’s awareness of their 
European rights is relatively basic, the mere voicing of European sources of law can be a 
contribution. Within the framework of his style of reasoning, the ombudsman can contribute 
to the strengthening of European rights both in the concrete case and generally. So far, 
however, the ombudsman has very rarely made reference to EU-law. The introduction of e.g. 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights by Danish ombudsman - and in particular 
Article 41 on the citizen’s right of good administration - by the ombudsman has still to come.    
 
 
8. Politics or Law?  
 
There are a variety of possible explanations why the Danish ombudsman – and perhaps other 
national ombudsman – adheres to a limited investigation and control of EU-law. The Danish 
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ombudsman has explicitly pointed out the necessity for caution and reservation because the 
institution – due to its lack of formal sanctions - has no powers under Article 234 of the 
Treaty to ask preliminary questions to the EU-Court. This is a long discussion that I will not 
go into in this paper. Another fundamental explanation for the cautious enforcement and 
development of European Principles that I would like to emphasize as a basic phenomenon is 
the Danish perception of EU-law a controversial – and “political” - source of law in various 
contexts. The EU-scepticism among the Danish population has no doubt had a huge impact 
on the Danish Parliament. The Euro-sceptic sentiment among the Danish population has 
manifested itself in referendums on the relationship between Denmark and the EC.  
 
In 1972 the Danish population with a clear majority voted in favour of joining what they 
basically believed to be an economic community with inherent advantages for Danish 
economy as well as for private businesses such a Danish agriculture. In domestic politics, the 
EC has traditionally been presented by politicians as a pragmatic cooperation in the general 
economic interests, and not as for instance a constitution-building project or as a constant 
integrative legal engine. The “true nature” of the EC project was revealed to the Danes some 
twenty years later after the accession in 1973 when the EC took the distinctive step to 
become the European Union (Maastricht 1992), This was a big awakening to the Danish 
population which responded by voting no at the 1992 referendum to the new treaty initiating 
a dramatic phase in Danish EU-politics. The year after, however, the Danes cast the yes vote 
with a narrow margin (Amsterdam 1993) when Denmark had managed to opt out of 
important legal elements in the treaties, such as common defence policy, cooperation on 
internal affairs, common currency and Union citizenship. In spite of the fact that a large 
majority of the Parliament has since then supported a constructive attitude towards further 
integration, the population is still deeply split over the issue. Most recently, the population 
rejected Danish acceptance of the common currency (European Monetary Union 2000).  
 
In this volatile political climate it is hardly surprising that the ombudsman institution finds 
itself trapped in a number of dilemmas as to the enforcement of EU-law and that the 
institution consequently generally prefers to keep a distance to EU-regulation. By handling 
conflicts between citizens and public authorities within the – “neutral” and “more legal” – 
framework of national procedural law requirements, the ombudsman manages to stay within 
a smooth sea without risking negative political reactions. If the EU and EU-law often give 
rise to heated political debate, the ombudsman is not likely to obtain easy and effective 
parliamentary support to his potential enforcement of citizens’ European rights. This 
perspective can generally put a damper on the ombudsman’s European ambitions. In 
addition, the ombudsman personally faces a dilemma in the sense that he risks alienating EU-
sceptical parties if he insists on enforcing EU-law in controversial cases whereas he reversely 
may provoke EU-supportive parties by not enforcing EU-law in controversial cases. Due to 
the basic fact that the Parliament appoints the ombudsman, the ombudsman presumptively 
endeavours to avoid confrontation with the Parliament. As a result, the ombudsman might 
prefer a low profile in EU-matters if he strives for re-election. In the mind of ombudsman 
institutions, law and politics are closely intertwined. EU-law is no exception.  
